The Mystery of the Mary Celeste: Part Three

The Mary Celeste ghost ship was found without a crew

None of the theories which we've looked at so far can account for all of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Mary Celeste's crew, so let us look again at some facts which may provide us with some clues: Mary Celeste was abandoned by her captain and crew, they didn't just disappear.  They left on the ship's yawl.  The yawl would have been overloaded and could easily capsize.  They left in a hurry, leaving all clothing, food, and water behind.  However, there can't have been total panic as they took the time to collect the chronometer, sextant, and ship's papers.  The condition of the ship showed little damage.  So, whatever forced the crew to abandon ship had to be something they feared had happened or something they believed was going to happen in the near future but clearly never did.

A plausible theory was suggested by James H. Winchester, part-owner of the Mary Celeste.  He speculated that the ship's cargo of denatured alcohol gave off fumes which could have collected in the hold, forming an explosive mixture.  This could have ignited by a spark given off by friction between the metal bands on the barrels rubbing together or by a naked flame used during an inspection of the cargo.  Or perhaps the fumes were mistaken for smoke, causing the crew to believe that the ship was going to explode.  When questioned, experts expressed the opinion that the vapour would not have been visible but an explosive mixture could have formed.  However, any resulting explosion would not have been minor and would have blown the Mary Celeste out of the water.

A Ship Exploding

Another theory which has potential suggests that, due to stormy weather, Briggs gave the order to sail to the nearby Santa Maria Island so the crew could take refuge.  The cook then started a fire in the large galley stove to make hot food while the crew furled most of the sails, leaving just enough to hold her heading along the shore of the island.  When the food had been prepared, the men stopped to eat and then went back to work, pumping the bilge and setting the sails.  At that moment the sea floor beneath Mary Celeste was torn apart by a shallow-focused earthquake which, in the Azores, is a relatively common occurrence.
When the hard bottom suddenly shifts upwards, the seabed behaves like a giant piston which pushes and pulls the water, sending powerful waves of alternating pressure towards the surface.  The result would make those on board feel like there was no water beneath the ship, making it seem as though she was sitting on dry land during an earthquake.  In the event of a seaquake, the magnitude does not determine how much disturbance the ship would have felt.  The damage suffered by the ship is based on the sudden hastening of the rocky seafloor at the epicentre, which determines the intensity of the shockwaves in the water.  A magnitude 5.5 earthquake could quite easily have occurred beneath the Mary Celeste, terrifying the crew while being relatively unnoticed on Santa Maria Island.

The deck of the ship would have shaken violently, tossing the heavy cast-iron deck stove into the air.  When it landed, it resettled in a position outside of the chocks, which would usually keep it from sliding around during heavy seas.  Pots and pans would have gone flying, much like the iron covers on top of the stove.  The flew pipe came loose, shooting red-hot embers from the fire into the air above deck.  Severe vibrations also loosened the stays around nine barrels of denatured grain alcohol, dumping around 500 gallons of explosive liquid into the bilge, with the fumes rapidly spreading to the upper deck.

Choking on alcohol fumes, hearing the crashing sounds that surrounded them, seeing the embers flying around would have caused panic, causing them to abandon ship on the yawl to escape a pending explosion and almost certain death.

Ship and Waterspout

Another plausible and perhaps the most probable theory comes, in part, from Oliver Deveau and was suggested at the salvage hearing.  Deveau expressed the belief that the crew had become convinced that the ship was sinking, causing them to panic.  While this theory has previously been dismissed as being idiotic, with Deveau being the idiot, his comment needs to be taken in context.  What might cause the crew to believe the Mary Celeste was sinking?

Dr. James H. Kimble, once head of the United States Weather Bureau in New York, and the author Gershorn Bradford both suggested that Mary Celeste was hit by a waterspout, cousin of the land tornado.  Both believe the waterspout would have been relatively small and harmless, causing very little damage and leaving the ship no worse off than if she had encountered a storm.  However, the waterspout's inside barometric pressure is very low and, as the spout passed over, the pressure difference between the inside and the outside of the ship may have caused the hatch covers to be blown off much like the way a building's walls explode outward when hit by a tornado.  The crew may have dropped a rod down the pump well to measure how much water was in the hold.  The drop in barometric pressure could potentially cause the bilge water to rise up the pump well where a valve would prevent it returning the the hold.  While it would only be a temporary malfunction, the crew may not have realised, instead believing the Mary Celeste had leaked 2 metres of water in less than a minute.  Obviously, if you were to believe this, the Captain would think the ship was fast sinking and would give the order to abandon ship.  It would also allow them time to collect the sextant, chronometer, and ship's papers.

by Henry Austin

But why did the crew not climb back aboard when they realised the danger had passed?

The three previous theories would all result in the Captain, his family, and the crew to take to the lifeboat.  The yawl would usually he attached to the ship by a rope, giving the occupants the opportunity to board the ship if need be.  But what if the crew had forgotten to properly secure the line between the yawl and the ship?  The crew and captain would have been elated when they realised it was safe to reboard the ship, but the elation would have quickly vanished when they discovered they were no longer tied to the ship.  It has been suggested that the rope had not been tightened enough and the knots unravelled, or perhaps the crew were too panicked and forgot to tie it at all.  So, when it became evident that the ship was not going to explode or sink, it would have already been a fair distance away.  The captain would have to decide whether to attempt to catch Mary Celeste or to sail for the safety of Santa Maria Island, which would have been less than ten miles away.  While the island was close and easy to reach, to return without Mary Celeste, a perfectly seaworthy ship with a valuable cargo,  was to be disgraced.  If they attempted to catch the runaway ship, they might catch her which, while unlikely, is not impossible.  Or they might not.  If correct, this theory would imply they never caught the Mary Celeste and, with no provisions, an overloaded yawl, and the possibility of further storms, the survival of the occupants seems unlikely.

Lost at Sea by y Michael Ross

Five months later, five decomposed bodies were discovered tied to two rafts at Baudus in Austurias, near Madrid, Spain.  One corpse was wrapped in the American flag.  The story was reported on May 16th 1873 in the Daily Albion of Liverpool.  It is possible that this was the remainder of the crew of Mary Celeste.  However, having never been investigated, we will never know who they were or what ship they belonged to.



Useful Resources
Ghost Ship: The Mysterious True Story of the Mary Celeste and Her Missing Crew by Brian Hicks
Mary Celeste: The Greatest Mystery of the Sea by Paul Begg
Into the Bermuda Triangle: Pursuing the Truth Behind the World's Greatest Mystery by Gian Quasar
Out of this world: Mysteries of mind, space and time
The Bermuda Triangle Mystery Solved by Lawrence David Kusche
The World's Greatest Unsolved Mysteries (Mysteries and Secret) by Lionel & Patricia Fanthorpe
Deaf Whale - Mary Celeste Was Abandoned During a Seaquake

The Mystery of the Mary Celeste: Part Two

So, what theories have been suggested to explain why the Mary Celeste was abandoned by her crew?  While no answer can be put forward with absolute certainty, a number of theories have since been voiced with some being more plausible than others.

 Marie Celeste by jacktar51

Flood's first theory was that the original crew may have gained access to the cargo of denatured alcohol, leading to the consequent murder of Captain Briggs, his wife, their child, and first mate Richardson.  This theory has been proposed on several occasions since - once by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, William A. Richard, in an open letter printed on the front page of the New York Times in 1873, which stated:

The circumstances of the case tend to arouse grave suspicion that the master, his wife, and child, and perhaps the chief mate , were murdered in the fury of drunkenness by the crew, who had evidently obtained access to the alcohol with which the vessel was in part laden.
It is thought that the vessel was abandoned by the crew between the 25th day of November and the 5th day of December and that they either perished at sea, or, more likely, escaped on some vessel bound for some North or South American port or the West India Islands.

However, in reality denatured alcohol is liable to give the drinker acute pains long before he could become truly intoxicated.  There is also the fact that Briggs strictly forbid his crew to drink alcohol aboard the ship.  Flood was forced to desert this theory.

The Ghost Ship Mary Celeste by Bill Hubbard

His next suggestion was that both Briggs and Morehouse were working together.  Flood believed their plan could have gone as follows.  Briggs would kill his crew and dispose of their bodies before launching the lifeboat and sailing to a prearranged destination.  In the meantime, Morehouse would 'discover' the Mary Celeste abandoned and would sail her to Gibraltar where he would claim the salvage money.  The two men would then meet at a later date to split the money.  While this theory is at least plausible, there is no evidence that either Briggs or Morehouse were criminals.  The fact that Briggs was also part-owner of the Mary Celeste makes this even less likely as the salvage money wouldn't even cover his original investment.  Knowing this gives the suggestion very little credibility.  Flood abandoned this theory too.

Flood's third theory was that Morehouse, along with his crew, had boarded the Mary Celeste, slaughtering everyone in order to claim the salvage money.  However, Morehouse was not greedy, although many a writer had implied that he was, and he was reluctant to claim the Mary Celeste.  He couldn't really spare the men who would form a skeleton crew which would leave both vessels undermanned and at risk in the event of an emergency.  He was, however, eventually persuaded by Deveau to do just that.  While Flood tried very hard to make this theory stick he succeeded only in generating an atmosphere of suspicion, leading Morehouse and his crew being considered guilty until proven innocent.  This claim was denounced, clearing Morehouse and the crew of Dei Gratia of any wrongdoing.  After a lengthy and controversial hearing, they were granted a salvage reward of £1,700.  Many believe they should have received two or three times this amount.

The court itself was unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for what had happened to the crew.  The accusations voiced by Flood caused many a rumour to fly, including that Morehouse and his crew were pirates who had either seized the ship for its salvage value and disposed of the original captain and crew, much like Flood's accusations.  Another rumour tells us that Morehouse had planted some of his crew aboard the Mary Celeste in New York, with them taking over the ship, killing the occupants and throwing them overboard before awaiting the arrival of Morehouse and the Dei Gratia.

The majority of theories following Flood's own suggestions generally vary on the theme of murder committed by either the Mary Celeste's crew or the Dei Gratia's crew.  One such theory suggests that the owner of the Mary Celeste, J. H. Winchester, arranged for the crew to murder Captain Briggs and his family before sinking the ship for insurance, but that they somehow bungled the job, losing their lives in the process.  Perhaps the plan called for the crew to abandon ship as she ploughed into the rocks near the Azores but an unexpected wind blew the ship to safety, leaving the crew to drown.

The Mary Celeste is attacked by a sea serpent

Other theories, however, are not uncommon and are often eccentric.  In the 1900s, people favoured the 'monster from the depths' stories in which the Mary Celeste was attacked by a giant octopus which plucked the entire crew from the deck.  While this theory may attact illustrators, there are, quite obviously, a number of flaws.  If, for example, such a large and savage creature were to exist, it still seems highly improbable that the crew would hang around waiting to be picked off one by one.  It also seems unlikely that said creature would crave the yawl, chronometer, sextant, and ship's papers.

Morris K. Jessup suggested that the crew of the Mary Celeste were abducted by a UFO, which cannot be proven true or false either way, but is, regardless, unlikely.  Bermuda Triangle authors list the crew as unfortunate victims of the unexplained forces that they believe exist within the area.  However, this would make the supposed force selective and the 'Bermuda Triangle' would need to be greatly enlarged to the point that it reaches the Azores.  Another theory put forward by a group of more rational people was that the food and drinking water were contaminated, causing the crew to hallucinate at which point they were driven made and threw themselves overhoard.  This particular theory is plausible if you know very little about the case, but Deveau and other members of Dei Gratia's crew who sailed the Mary Celeste back to port used both the food and water and suffered no such effects.  It has also been suggested that, somewhere near the Azores, Mary Celeste became stranded on a 'ghost island', a shifting sandbar which comes and goes, and constantly changes position.  Believing that they were stranded indefinitely, the crew perhaps took to the yawl and were lost at sea while Mary Celeste was freed when the sandbar drifted, sailing back out to sea without a soul on board.

Many years after the actual event too place, one man claimed to be the only surviving member of the crew, alleging that the captain challenged the mate to a swimming race around the ship with both being killed by a shark.  As the remaining crew watched, Mary Celeste was struck by a rogue wave, dumping them all overboard.  The ship, however, remained upright and sailed on minus all but one of her crew.

One claimant's story appeared in the Nautical Magazine of Glasgow with Captain Dmitri Lukhmanov, identified as an 'agent of the Russian Volunteer fleet at Hong Kong,' writing about a man he had met in 1884.  Lukhmanov claims that a Greek sailor named Demetrius Specioti spoke of how he had sailed aboard the 'Ghost Ship' under another name.  Apparently, after a routine trip across the Atlantic, the crew of the 'Marie Celeste', as this account refers to her, were lost not far from Gibraltar when they were attacked by pirates.  The pirate ship had been flying the British flag when Briggs spotted it.  Speciati said that someone on this mystery vessel had signalled that they were short of provisions and were starving.

Abandoning Mary Celeste by Ken Petts

Briggs apparently invited them aboard so they could refresh their supplies.  It was only when the vessel drew alongside them that the crew of Marie Celeste noticed that something wasn't quite right, with only one man at the oars and a huge tarp covering the remainder of the boar.  By this point it was already too late; pirates jumped from beneath the tarp and overpowered Briggs and his crew, explaining that they had lost too many of their crew to disease and were in need of extra hands to man their ship.  Specioti said that the pirates left the Marie Celeste deserted for the Dei Gratia to find.
 It was not until later that the crew perished, according to Specioti.  While they were treated reasonably well by the pirates, a fever which had killed many of the original pirate crew eventually claimed Briggs anf his family.  The remaining crew apparently hatched a plan to overrun their captors, but waited too long.  Unfortunatelyan Italian mailer steamer collided with the pirate ship, sinking it and killing everyone aboard except, conveniently, Demetrius Specioti.  He claimed that, in the resulting confusion, he managed to get aboard the Italian ship, securing passage to the next port.  While there are documented cases of pirates taking ships near the African coast as recently as the 1890s, no one really seemed interested in Specioti's story.

Another claimant, one of many 'survivors' who have cropped up in the fifty years following the incident whose names are mysteriously absent from the crew list, had his 'true account' printed in an article called The Truth about the Marie Celeste: A Survivor's Tale, written by Lee Kaye, in Chamber's Journal in 1925.  The claimant, John Pemberton, claimed to have joined the crew of the Mary Celeste as ship's cook in 1870.  Pemberton went on to say that, in 1872, the crew were short-handed and this probably explained why Briggs would hire a 'sad bully' named Hullock for his mate.  Apparently Hullock and Briggs did not get along because Hullock had previously proposed to Sarah Briggs.  She had refused and Hullock blamed Briggs from keeping himaway from the woman he loved.  Pemberton also claimed that Briggs and Morehouse were partners in crime, planning to exchange a piece of the charter for some of Morehouse's crew.  They would meet off the Azores to transfer the sailors for cargo, but apparently there was a more sinister plan in the pipeline and trouble started soon before the ships would meet.

Pemberton claimed that early in the voyage Sarah Briggs was playing the pianoforte in the cabin during a storm when the securing lines snapped, crushing her to death.  Briggs was driven insane, accusing Hullock of sabotage and, shortly after, he went as far as accusing the entire crew of murder and ordered the steersman be thrown overboard.  The crew ignored the order but threw the pianoforte into the sea, hoping to calm their captain.  Later the same night, Briggs disappeared and Hullock is said to have told a crewmember that the captain 'went after the piano.'  By the end of November another sailor had been lost at sea during a brawl and two others deserted in the yawl.  When the Mary Celeste finally met with the Dei Gratia near the Azores, Morehouse discovered that only three sailors and Pemberton had survived the trip, so he took the ship for salvage money, claiming to have found it deserted.

A Brig's Officers Believed to Have Been Murdered at Sea

Pemberton's tale, while containing more that its fair share of factual errors, was expanded to book length by Lawrence J. Keating in 1929 and found a massive audience by offering a tale rich in detail.  The elements of unrequited love, jealousy, and murder made other stories about the ship pale in comparison and, with Pemberton still living, the story appeared credible.  The book, The Great Mary Celeste Hoax, was a bestseller on both sides of the Atlantic, and Pemberton rapidly rose to fame.  Keating, in his introduction, claimed the noble intention of putting 'on record an exact and accurate account of what really did happen on board the vessel during her famous and magical voyage, to explain why and how she was abandoned, and to reveal what became of the crew.'  He also claimed to have interviewed 'survivors', referencing a number of official papers to expose the mystery, while offering no clue of where the answers had hidden for fifty years.  He stated: It would not be possible nor appropriate, in a book of the present dimensions, to include in extenso all the reports and documents which have been examined for the purpose of this work, or to recount in detail the complete narratives of the men who have knowledge of the separate phases of the mystery of the Mary Celeste.  While Keating corrected the mistakes he had made in the article, when stretched to full length, the tale was so full of unrealistic plot lines that it was almost meaningless.  However, the book was published by reputable publishing houses in both London and New York, making it the most successful book published on the famous ghost ship.

Many an interview was sought by journalists, but Pemberton remained elusive until a 'special correspondent' of the London Evening Standard somehow managed to track him down.  People began to question the tale, with Frederick J. Shepard, a librarian in Buffalo, commenting in the Buffalo News that the book had 'scarcely a correctly stated fact in it.'  Even the painting in the front of the book bore no resemblence to the real Mary Celeste.  While the book was slated by many, some reporters searched high and low for the survivor who had told the tale.  The coveted interview was obtained as well as a photograph of Pemberton, with both being published on May 6th, 1929 in the Evening Standard.

However, 20 years later, it came to light that the only true statement in Keating's book was in the title.  Macdonald Hastings, a British writer and one-time editor of The Strand, made some inquiries about Lawrence Keating and received a letter from another old ship captain who had met Keating.  A mutual friend of the captain and Hastings declared Keating a fake.  The story had been a hoax with Lee Kaye, Lawrence Keating and the Evening Standard's 'special correspondent' being one and the same person - an Irish Liverpudlian named Lawrence J. Keating.  Hastings noted that the Evening Standard article had already proved the tale a fake because the photograph of the man professing to be John Pemberton did not exist.  He was actually Keating's father.

That's all for today.  Next time we will look at the plausible theories for the disappearance of Mary Celeste's crew.

The Mystery of the Mary Celeste: Part One

The 'disappearance' of the Mary Celeste, a 103 foot long brigantine weighing 282 tons, is considered by many to be one of the most interesting mysteries of the sea.  All derelict ships are compared to it no matter where they are found.  In fact, any real mystery is called the 'Mary Celeste' of its field; Flight 19, for example, is known as the 'Mary Celeste of aviation'.  However, Mary Celeste never actually disappeared.  When looking at this particular mystery, it was in fact the crew that disappeared and were never heard from again.  The crew's disappearance is the central element of the long and unfortunate history of the Mary Celeste, which was considered by many seamen to be jinxed.

Mary Celeste's Crew List

The Captain of the Mary Celeste was Benjamin Spooner Briggs.  Born in Wareham, Massachusetts on 24th April 1835, Briggs was the second of five sons and the third of six children born to Captain Nathan and his wife Sophia.  This was a seafaring family, with two of the five sons becoming master mariners at an early age, one of which was Benjamin, and all but one of the sons going to sea.  Benjamin's sister, Maria, also went to sea when she married a sea captain named Joseph D. Gibbs.  Briggs had already commanded the schooner Forest King, the barque Arthur, and the brigantine Sea Foam.  Some later authors portrayed Briggs as a man whose religious beliefs, along with his insistence that all his crew abstain from alcohol, made him fanatical, causing him to be weak and ineffectual as a captain.  However, he was actually believed to be a man of strict beliefs and religious conviction.  Those who knew him described Briggs as having 'the highest character as a Christian and as an intelligent and active shipmaster.'  Briggs was also a new shareholder in the Mary Celeste, ready to take her on her first voyage after a meticulous refit.

Benjamin, Sarah and Sophia Briggs

Briggs also brought two family members along for the voyage.  Sarah Elizabeth Briggs, the daughter of a preacher of the Congregational Church in Marion, Massachusetts and Captain Briggs wife, and Sophia Matilda Briggs, their 2 year old daughter, also made the voyage, while their eldest child, Arthur Stanley, remained at home with his grandmother.

Albert G. Richardson, first mate of the Mary Celeste

The first mate of Mary Celeste was 28 year old Albert G. Richardson, who was considered to be trustworthy and competent.  Richardson was a soldier in the American Civil War and was married to a niece of James H. Winchester, part-owner of the Mary Celeste.  Both Richardson and Briggs had worked together previously and Richardson was held in high esteem.

Andrew Gilling, whose birthplace was given as New York, served as second mate.  It is believed that he was actually of Danish extraction, due to the pastor of the parish of Kathy, Samso, Denmark having written to the Royal Danish Consul at Gibraltar on July 8th, 1873 on behalf of 'the bereaved and sorrowful mother' of Andrew Gilling.  The pastor sought any information pertaining to his fate and asked how he should proceed in having Gilling's possessions returned to his mother.  Gilling is also believed to have been honest and respectable.

The cook and steward, 23 year old Edward William Head, came from Brooklyn, New York, where he was respected by those that knew him.  He was described by Captain Winchester in the New York Sunday World as coming from Williamsburg 'where he was respected by all who knew him.'

Four other sailors, all of German birth, concludes the crew list of the Mary Celeste.  Very little is known about these four men.  Two of the seamen, Volkert and Boz Lorenzen, were believed to be brothers who lost all of their possessions when shipwrecked prior to their joining the crew of the Mary Celeste.  There is some mystery surrounding the oldest member of the crew, 35 year old Arian Martens who, while a qualified and experienced mate, had only signed on with Briggs as an ordinary seaman.  The final member of the crew was 23 year old Gottlieb Goodschaad or Goodschaal.  While we have very little information about these four seamen, they appear to have been of god character.

On 24th March 1873, a T. A. Nickelsen wrote to the US Consul in Gibraltar from Utersum on the Isle of Fohr, which was then a part of Prussia:

DEAR SIR - Please excuse me for writing these few lines of information regarding two sailors (brothers) belonging to the American Brig Mary Celeste, their mother and their wives wish to know in which condition the ship has been found, whether the boats were gone or not, whether the log-book has been found on board or not, so as to find out what day they have left the ship, and further do they like to know whether any sign of disturbance have been found on board.  I know three of the sailors personally and know them to be peaceable and first-class sailors.  Please favour us with an answer and let us know your opinion why they left said brig - I remain, Yours truly, T. A, Nickelsen

Nickelson was referring to the brothers Volkert and Boz Lorenzen and Arian Martens.  Both Volkert and Boz had a wife, and Volkert also had a daughter, Ida.  Martens was also married and, when he disappeared, his wife was pregnant with their second daughter, Clara.

Prior to the voyage, Mary Celeste was loaded with 1701, or, according to some, 1709, barrels of denatured grain alcohol, valued at $37,000, which was shipped by Meissnet Ackerman and Co., merchant of New York.  The destination was Genoa, Italy, and it was to be delivered to Mascerenhas and Co.  Briggs explained to his mother in a letter dated November 3rd 1872 that the preparations for the voyage were 'tedious, perplexing and very tiresome.'  Loading of the cargo was completed before dark on Sunday 2nd November with Briggs planning to sail on the Tuesday.  He visited the New York office of the United States Shipping Commissioner on Monday to sign the 'Articles of Agreement' with the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, accepting liability for $3,400 on the vessel's freight.  Some accounts of the tale claim that Briggs and his wife met with Captain Morehouse of Dei Gratia for dinner the evening before the voyage began at Astor House, which, for many years, was considered the finest hotel in the United States.  There is, however, no evidence that the two men knew each other.

Mary Celeste as Amazon in 1861

Then, early on 5th November 1872, Mary Celeste was towed from Pier 44 to a bay of Staten Island, New York by the Sandy Hook pilot ship.  The Mary Celeste, however, didn't begin her voyage until November 7th due to storms which forced Briggs to drop anchor for an extra two days before he was willing to risk venturing out to sea.  Sarah wrote to her mother-in-law telling her, 'it was strong head wind, and B sail it looked so thick and nasty ahead we shouldn't gain much if we were beating and banging about.'  They sought shelter, waiting for the weather to calm before finally setting sail.  This was the last time anyone would see the crew of Mary Celeste.
Some believers in jinxes and predetermined misfortune may blame the Mary Celeste for her bad luck.  Others might blame the Briggs family, who seem to have been equally doomed.  The Mary Celeste suffered misfortune from the day she was launched, but the Briggs family also seem to attracted disaster.  Benjamin, as we know, vanished at sea.  His brother, Oliver, was lost at sea when his ship sank.  Nathan and Zenas, two other brothers, died at sea of yellow fever.  His sister Maria drowned when her husband's ship was struck by a steamer and his father was killed when he was struck by lightning as he stood in the doorway of his home.

Eight days after Mary Celeste departed from New York, Dei Gratia left with a cargo of petroleum bound for Gibraltar on November 15th 1872 with David Reed Morehouse, a Nova  Scotian, as her captain.  Oliver Deveau served as first mate.  Both the captain and the rest of the crew of the Dei Gratia were experienced seamen and are believed by most to have been of good character.

Chart of approximate course taken by Mary Celeste and Dei Gratia

Twenty days later, on December 5th, John Johnson of the British brigantine Dei Gratia sighted a vessel around 5 miles off the port bow shortly after 1pm, between the Azores and Portugal.  To be exact, Mary Celeste was discovered drifting at 38° 20' north, 17° 15' west, 599 miles west of Gibraltar.  It is interesting to note the location at which Mary Celeste was found when taking into consideration the fact that they mystery of the Mary Celeste and her missing crew are so often included in tales of the Bermuda Triangle.  In actual fact, she was no where near the Triangle at any point from November 25th, when Briggs wrote in the temporary log, to when she was first sighted by the Dei Gratia on December 5th.

Having noticed the poor condition of the ship's sails along with her slight 'yawing' and the lack of people on the deck of the mystery vessel, Johnson called the second mate, John Wright, and together they spoke with Captain Morehouse.  Morehouse studied the ship through his telescope and then gave the order to offer assistance.  At around 3pm, having closed the distance to about 400 yards of the mystery ship, Morehouse hailed her several times.  No reply was received, leading to Morehouse's decision to send some of his crew aboard to investigate.

An engraving of Mary Celeste as she was found, abandoned

Deveau, Wright and Johnson rowed over to the ship, noticing the name Mary Celeste as they neared it.  Johnson stayed in the boat while Deveau and Wright climbed aboard.  Over the next hour they searched Mary Celeste from stem to stern.  The main staysail was discovered on the foreward house both the foresail and upper foresail had been lost.  The fore-topmost staysail (the jib) and the fore-lower-topsail were set with the remaining sails furled.  Some of the running rigging was in poor condition, parts having blown away and other parts hanging over the side of the ship.  The main peak halyard - a stiff 90 metre long rope used to hoist the outed end of the gaff sail - was broken and mostly missing.  The binnacle had been knocked over and was broken.  The ship's wheel was spinning.  Some of the hatch covers were well secured but others had been removed and were found discarded near the hatchways.  There was less than 30cm of water in the galley and most of the six months' provisions were unspoilt.  There was also an ample supply of fresh water.  The cargo of denatured alcohol was intact and in good conditions.  While the condition of the ship was better than most vessels that then regularly sailed the Atlantic, she was completely deserted.  Her condition showed signs of having recently been caught in a storm but there was no evidence to provide clues as to why she had been abandoned by her crew.

Deveau found the temporary log on the table in Captain Briggs' cabin.  The most recent recording read: Monday 25th.  At five o'clock made island of St Mary's bearing ESE.  At eight o'clock Eastern point bore SSW six miles distant.  Deveau also found a chart showing Mary Celeste's progress up to November 24th.

Some accounts tells us that a meal had been prepared, or that the meal was cooking on the stove.  Others have the dishes washed and properly stored away.  Others still detail how the table had been laid with still warm cups of coffee, tea, eggs, bacon, bread and butter.  A vial of oil was supposedly found sitting upright on a sewing machine, which would indicate calm seas.  It is impossible to know which accounts are fact and which are fiction, although most are likely fictional.

The True Story of the Mary Celeste

The captain's personal items were all on board and there were apparently toys on his bed, as if a child had been playing there.  Some versions tell us a sword was found hanging on the wall or under the captain's bed, sometimes with blood stains, sometimes with rust stains, sometimes with nothing.  Some versions of the tale tell us that blood or wine stains were seen on the woodwork and on the sails, although wine stains would indicate the drinking of alcohol when the captain was strictly against any being consumed aboard the ship.  Others make no mention of alcohol at all.

A number of items were missing: the chronometer, sextant, bill of landing, navigation book, and a small yawl which had been lashed to the main hatch, although some accounts have the yawl still of the ship when it was searched by Deveau.  The railing which had run along beside the yawl had been removed.  This at least answered the question of where the ship's crew had gone; the abandoned ship.  It didn't, however, offer an explanation of why Briggs would abandon a perfectly seaworthy ship in favour of a small and comparatively unstable boat, especially when one considers that he had his family with him.  Sailors have always considered abandoning ship as a desperate act which is only taken when there is no other alternative.  Descriptions of the ship's condition vary considerably, but overall Mary Celeste was in good condition.  As one of Dei Gratia's crew later said, Mary Celeste was 'in a fit enough state to sail around the world.'

A painting the Dei Gra­tia

Deveau along with two other seamen, Augustus Anderson and Charles Lund, had the Mary Celeste ready to sail within two days.  Together the Mary Celeste and Dei Gratia set sail for Gibraltar.  On December 12th the two ships arrived and, within two hours of dropping anchor, the crew were placed under arrest by Thomas J. Vecchio, of the Vice-Admiralty Court.  Frederick Solly Flood, the Attorney General for Gibraltar and Advocate General for the Queen in her Office of Admiralty, believed the abandonment of Mary Celeste could only be a result of murder and piracy.  Without Flood the mystery of Mary Celeste would probably have faded into obscurity.  However, his accusations voiced at the hearings in the Vice-Admiralty Court attracted worldwide publicity, with Flood asking one question above all others.

Why was Mary Celeste abandoned?

That's all of today.  Next time we will look at the theories which have been suggestion to account for the abandonment of Mary Celeste.  As with Flight 19, I will include all sources at the end of the final post on Mary Celeste.

Flight 19: The Lost Squadron - Part One

The General Location of the Infamous Bermuda Triangle

Many authors on the subject of the Bermuda Triangle are of the opinion that the modern day fascination with the Triangle's mystery stems from what happened to Flight 19.  On 5th December, 1945, Bermuda Triangle writers tell us that five aircraft, flying together in formation with a combined crew of thirteen, simply disappeared.  They also like to include one of the rescue aircraft in this mystery, which would mean six aircraft, along with forty-one crew members, vanished into thin air.  The 'disappearance' of these aircraft sparked one of the largest air and sea rescues ever seen in history, with the actual event seeming so extraordinary that public interest grew, encouraging a journalistic review of both earlier and later disappearances.  This review was to establish not only the reputation of the Bermuda Triangle, but also its name.  However, as is often the case, the popularised myth of Flight 19 as it is often told lacks one important ingredient - facts.  The disappearance of the five TBM Avengers has become so distorted and embellished that it is sometimes difficult to tell the facts from the fiction.

What Was Flight 19?

Flight 19 was the nineteenth flight in a roster for take off from the Naval Air Station, Fort Lauderdale
in Florida.  Fort Lauderdale, around 20 miles north of Miami, serves as base for prospective naval pilots to undergo advanced navigational training before they are assigned duties on carriers at sea.

The planned flight path of Flight 19

The tale of Flight 19 tells us that the prospective pilots were executing a basic training exercise,
which, ironically, was based on a triangular flight plan.  Charles Berlitz tells us that the five planes were 'on a routine training mission... both pilots and crew were experienced airmen.'  The exercise started at about 2:10pm, starting at Fort Lauderdale, and was scheduled to go on for around 2 hours and 15 minutes, taking them no further from base than 123 miles east over the Bahamas.  At 140mph, it should be less that an hours distance to reach base as the crow flies.  This meant, in case of an emergency, it wouldn't take them too long to return.  Flight 19 was assigned what the Navy's Inquiry Report calls Problem No. 1, during which they were to fly 091° (east) for 56 miles to Chicken and Hen Shoals in order to conduct low level bombing.  They were to continue on 091° for 67 miles.  The next leg was on a course of 346° (north) for 73 miles and then to fly 241° (west-southwest) for 120 miles to bring them back to Fort Lauderdale.  The three corners of this triangle were marked by nearby land.  The weather was fair to average and Berlitz says that 'pilots who had flown earlier the same day reported ideal flying conditions.'

The Aircraft

The planes to be used during the flight exercise were General Motors Avenger torpedo bombers.  In World War II the TBM Avenger earned a reputation as the most deadly torpedo bomber ever built.  Avengers had two designations which depended on who made them.  Those constructed by Grumman Aircraft Corporation were called TBF's, and those made by General Motors were called TBM's.  The Avengers lived up to their name while operating from both land bases and aircraft carriers, beginning service in the spring of 1942 and being responsible for the sinking of the Japanese battleship 'Yamato', her escort of four destroyers and the cruiser 'Yahagi'.  The Avenger had a wingspan of 54 feet and was equipped with a Wright Cyclone B-2600 engine which developed 1,600 horsepower.  This gave the plane a top speed of close to 300 miles an hour for 1,000 miles.  They carried one standard torpedo or a 2,000 pound bomb.  They were also equipped with a 50-calibre machine gun beneath the forward cowl, with another in a power-operated ball.

Five Avengers in Flight

According to later testimony, all planes were carefully pre flighted and held full tanks of fuel, offering the squadron a range of over 1,000 miles.  All equipment, engines, and instruments were said to be in perfect working order.  Each TBM Avenger was equipped with extensive radio instruments, including ten communication channels and homing device which showed the heading the squadron would need to take in order to return to base.  Every plane also included a self-inflating life raft and each crew member had access to a Mae West life jacket.


The Pilots and Their Crew

The flight leader was a veteran of combat in the South Pacific named Lieutenant Charles Taylor, who was to fly FT-28.  He had been flying since 1941.  He was, according the the Inquiry Report, 'the authorised and assigned instructor in charge of Flight 19.'  The other pilots were all said to be accomplished servicemen that had switched to the Naval Air Force, with 350 or more hours of flight experience.  One 1942 Naval Academy graduate of Annapolis, Marine Captain George Stivers Jr, who was to pilot FT-117, was particularly respected for having been cited three times for bravery in the South Pacific.  Marine Captain Edward J. Powers Jr, a marine since 1941 and a graduate of Princeton, was an able officer who had been assigned as a training instructor at Quantico, Virginia during the war and was assigned to FT-36.  Marine Second Lieutenant Jimmy Gerber, who was to pilot FT-81, had joined the marines  after Pearl Harbour, working his way up to officer and pilot.  Ensign Joseph Bossi had been a pilot for only two years, declining discharge to give him the opportunity to continue flying planes like the Avenger, and was to fly FT-3. 

The Squadron of Flight 19

Stivers, Powers, Gerber and Bossi were naval aviators who were undergoing instruction in 'VTB Type Advanced Training,' with eight out of the nine crew members undergoing 'Advanced Combat Aircrew Training in VTB type aircraft'.  For these four pilots, who had already completed two similar exercises in the area, the Flight 19 exercise was to be their final hop.

In addition to the pilots, each Avenger was to carry two crew, a gunner, and a radio man, who were receiving advanced training with their pilot.  The only aircraft carrying an all-veteran crew, who were also experienced marines and navy men, was Taylor's.  When the flight began that day they were short by one man - the radio man for Gerber's plane, who had failed to arrive, leaving FT-81 with only the pilot Gerber and his gunner, Billy Longfoot.

The Myth

The popularised myth tells us that the flight looked to be routine, perhaps even dull.  They completed the scheduled bombing practise at Chicken and Hen Shoals before heading further east and then northwest.  At 3:50pm, when the flight should be requesting landing instructions, Taylor told Powers that his compasses appeared to be malfunctioning.  The pilots compared their compass headings but this did little more than cause disagreement and further confusion.  Two of the five were certain that they should head west, but the rest simply could not agree.

Taylor contacted the control tower, saying, 'Calling tower.  This is an emergency.  We seem to be off course.  We cannot see land... repeat... we cannot see land.'  The tower is said to have requested their current position, with Taylor replying that he was unsure of their position.  'We cannot be sure just where we are.  We seem to be lost.'  Lauderdale suggested they take a heading of due west, but Taylor, according to the myth, is said to have responded, 'We don't know which way is west.  Everything is wrong... strange.  We can't be sure of just where we are.  We are not sure of any direction.  Even the ocean doesn't look as it should.'

When Robert Cox asked Taylor for his present altitude, the flight was silent for a few minutes.  Taylor is then said to have cried, 'Don't come after me!  They look like...'  This was followed by silence.  According to the tale, this transmission, heard at 4:30pm, was the last received from Taylor with the rescue mission being dispatched to the bombers' last estimated position within minutes.  One Navy officer is said to have commented that both Flight 19 and the search plane had 'vanished completely as if they had flown to Mars.'

A copy of a 6 December 1945 newspaper, relating the news.

The story raises many questions, such as: why did Taylor refuse help from Cox?; What did Taylor see when he called out, 'They look like...'?  Joan Powers, the widow of Lieutenant Powers, has been quoted as saying, 'My own theory is that the men saw something up there over the Triangle... something which so frightened Lieutenant Taylor that he did not want Cox to jeopardise his own life; something which, possibly for national security reasons, the Navy still does not want the public to know about.'

The Facts

If the mythical tale was correct, it would rank Flight 19 as the most baffling mystery in the history of aviation.  However, when looking at the official report, along with other reliable witnesses, the events of the day show the popularised tale to be almost completely inaccurate, giving an impression of cloudless skies, experienced airmen, and a flight plan that they knew well.

In actual fact, the real version of events differ greatly from those portrayed in the myth, as is obvious when looking at the Navy's later investigation into the incident, which took several months with the subsequent report being more than 400 pages long.  The first message was not actually received by the tower at Fort Lauderdale.  Instead it was Lieutenant Robert Cox, another flight instructor, who was flying near Fort Lauderdale when he overheard two pilots discussing their headings and compasses.

In his testimony during the Navy Inquiry, Cox said: 'I was flying around the field at approximately 3:40pm...  I heard some planes or boats.  One man was transmitting on 4805 (the channel used by training flights) to 'Powers'.  That is the word he used and he didn't give any recognition.  The party calling asked 'Powers' what his compass read a number of times and finally said, 'I don't know where we are.  We must have got lost after that last turn.'  During this time, at approximately 3:45pm, I called Operation Radio, Fort Lauderdale, and notified them that either a boat or some planes were lost.  They Rogered my message.'

Believing the flight was in trouble, Cox attempted to contact the flight, saying , 'This is FT-74, plane or boat called 'Powers', please identify yourself so someone can help you.'  He received no answer.  Cox's testimony goes on to say: 'Later he called and asked if anyone had any suggestions.  I called again, giving my identification as FT-74, and he answered, giving his as MT-28.'  A series of transmissions then ensued between Cox and, it is believed, Taylor.

Original Painting on exhibit 'Flight 19' by Bob Jenny

Cox: MT-28 this is FT-74.  What is your trouble?
Taylor: Both my compasses are out and I'm trying to find Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  I am over land but it's broken.  I'm sure I'm in the Keys, but I don't know how far down and I don't know how to get to Fort Lauderdale.
Cox: MT-28, this is FT-74.  Put the sun on your port wing if you're in the Keys and fly up the coast until you get to Miami, then Fort Lauderdale is 20 miles further, your first port after Miami.  The air station is directly on your left from the port.  What is your present altitude?  I will fly south and meet you.
Taylor:  I know where I am now, I'm at 2,300 feet.  Don't come after me.
Cox: MT-28, Roger, you're at 2,300 feet.  I'm coming after you anyhow.

Cox's testimony continues: 'I then received a call from Fort Lauderdale asking if it was FT-28 or MT-28, and after calling MT-28 again, I learned that it was FT-28 and relayed the message to Fort Lauderdale.'

The last two sentences of transmission are often elaborated, as in the myth where Taylor tells Cox 'Don't come after me...It looks like...', where there is actually no mention of anything looking remotely unusual in the official report.  However, while Taylor said that he knew where the flight were, he was wrong.  He didn't know and this led to increasing confusion.

Cox departed from his own squadron and flew to the Keys, where Taylor believed his flight to be.  Shortly after, he received another message from FT-28.  'Can you have Miami or someone turn on their radar gear and pick us up?  We don't seem to be getting far.  We were out on a navigation hop and on the second leg I thought they were going wrong so I took over and was flying them back to the right position, but I'm sure now that neither one of my compasses are working.'  Cox responded, 'You can't expect to get here in ten minutes.  You have a 30 to 35 knot head or cross wind.  Turn on your emergency IFF gear (to make the plane's image brighter on a radar screen), or do you have it?'  Taylor replied that it didn't and Cox suggested that Taylor should turn on his ZBX gear, but received no response.

Fort Lauderdale and Port Everglade also attempted to get Taylor to switch on his ZBX or IFF gear.  Cox's testimony goes on to say, 'I don't know whether they got an answer.  Fort Lauderdale suggested I tell FT-28 to have one of his wingmen take over the lead and I did this.  I received no direct answer, but I heard some transmission about radar or something.'

Aerial view of NASFL with a Squadron of Avengers in mid-flight celebrating the end of the war, 1945

As Cox neared the Keys, he noticed that the communications made by Flight 19 didn't seem to be improving as they should be.  Instead, they appeared to be worsening.  He called Taylor, saying, 'Your transmissions are fading.  Something is wrong.  What is your altitude?'  Taylor responded, saying that he was at 4,300 feet.  Unfortunately, at this point Cox's AC transmitter stopped working and he lost the power to send transmissions on Flight 19's radio frequency.  He attempted to contact them on all nine available channels, finally reaching Fort Lauderdale on channel 7.

Cox said: 'As his transmissions were fading he must have been going north.  I believe at the time of his first transmissions he was either over the Biminis or the Bahamas.  I was about forty miles below Fort Lauderdale and couldn't hear him any longer.'  Commander Richard Baxter, an assistant operations officer of the coast guard office, commented in his testimony: 'In my estimation [the planes] were near Walker City [40 miles north of Grand Bahama Island] when they thought they were over the Keys.'  This opinion was later shared by both Lieutenant Cox and the Board of Inquiry, and was offered as an explanation for why the flight never returned to land.  However, it does not account for the fact that Flight 19 followed this heading for more than 25 minutes before turning west which, providing the above estimate is correct, would have taken them to the east coast of Florida safely within an hour.

Satellite View of the Bahamas

The Bahamas and Florida Keys are actually surprisingly similar from above, with some islands looking almost identical.  Bruce Gernon and his copilot, who recreated the flight path followed by Flight 19, noticed that the lower over the Bahamas they went, the more they seemed to resemble the Keys.  'In particular, a group of twenty islands between Grand Bahama and Little Abaco Island, known as the Cross Cays, looked like islands in the lower keys surrounding Big Pine Key.  The difference, of course, was that a series of bridges connect a string of the keys.  However, there are dozens of smaller keys that aren't connected by bridges.'

 Satellite View of the Florida Keys

At 4:25pm Port Everglades were able to establish contact with Taylor and requested a radio check.  Taylor told them that he heard them and that they had just passed over a small island.  There was no other land in sight.

That's it for today.  I won't list the sources on this post, but will put them at the end of the subject of Flight 19.  Next time we will continue with the story of Flight 19.

Flight 19: The Lost Squadron - Part Three

Taylor was evidently disorientated and his situation was made more difficult due to a number of influencing factors.  His instruments were malfunctioning, or at least he believed they were.  He didn't have a clock or a watch, meaning he had little idea of how long the squadron had been in the air.  His radio channel was experiencing interference from nearby Cuban radio stations and, due to the fear of losing contact with the rest of his flight, Taylor was deterred from changing his frequency to the undisturbed emergency channel.  He took his flight first in one direction, then another and, as night fell, the weather and the sea grew rough.

Original

At around 5:50pm, an approximate fix was obtained on Flight 19, placing them within a 100 mile radius of 29°, 15 minutes north, 79°, 80 minutes west.  The squadron were somewhere north of the Bahamas and east of New Smyma, Florida.  If Taylor could be informed of this, he would only need to head west and Flight 19 would make land.  Unfortunately, the radio signal became progressively worse and Port Everglades were unable to reach the squadron to give them this information.  From this point onwards, Flight 19's progress could no longer be charted and the rescue mission, while executed, was unable to determine the final location of the flight.

At 6:05pm radio operaters expected the flight to be confirming that the shoreline lights were in sight.  Instead, they overheard flight transmissions indicating that there was no land in sight and Taylor was becoming increasingly worried.  He insisted that the flight must be in the Gulf of Mexico and that their westerly heading, which had been their course for the last 55 minutes, was taking them further from land.  At this point he suggested that Powers should turn the flight east again.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that Powers followed this recommendation, perhaps becuase the rest of the squadron knew that there had been no land behind them for at least half an hour.

Added to this mystery was a high frequency fix, which placed the fix around 225 miles northeast of Fort Lauderdale, or roughly 150 to 200 miles off the east coast of Florida, between New Smyrna Beach and Jacksonville.  This indicated that Flight 19 had flown much further into the Atlantic than was thought and that, while they believed they had been heading west or northwest for around an hour, they had actually been flying north.

It became apparant that this flight was not what would be considered typical for a lost flight, with some personnel at the bases becoming convinced that none of Flight 19's equipment was working correctly.  This belief has been sustained by examination of several puzzling statements made by the flight.  Their westward heading, even according to Powers' compasses, seemed to take them north instead of west, with the flight dialogue being noteworthy due to the undertone of mild panic which was present even early in the flight when there seemed to be little reason for it.

Flight 19 by Boober61

Instrument malfunction, which seems to have included compasses, fuel gauges, airspeed indicators, and perhaps altimeters, is potentially suggested by some of the following recorded dialogue.  Not long after Taylor announced that they were lost, he expressed a degree of frustration and impatience when he commented, 'We don't seem to be getting far,' in relation to their speed and the amount of ground they had covered.  When Taylor explained to Cox how he believed they'd become lost, he said, 'We were out on a navigational hop and on the second leg I thought they were going wrong, so I took over and was flying them back to the right position, but I'm sure now that neither one of my compasses are working.'

Both of Taylor's compasses were probably in perfect working order.  However, Taylor was compensating for 30 to 40 mph winds, with the TBM facing winds of up to 87 mph.  He turned into the third leg of the exercise before crossing the checkpoint, probably die to strong headwinds and, when they failed to arrive at Fort Lauderdale at the expected time, Taylor decided that his compasses were faulty.  It seems strange and mystifying that, given the circumstances, none of the other pilots bothered to correct Taylor by telling him that they were actually on the right course to being with.  Instead they seemed as surprised or unsure as Taylor was when he asked for a compass comparison.

There were also no IFF signals received from other planes despite confirmation from the flight that they were on IFF.  Nor did their ZBX instrument, or homing device, detect the beacon at Fort Lauderdale.  Another interesting comment made by one of the pilots at 5:55pm was, 'We may have to ditch any minute,' which would indicate that they were low on fuel, although they should have had more than enough at this point.

Newspaper Report

Throughout the final hour of contact between the flight and base, messages were fragmented and strained.  At 6:30pm, Taylor tried desperately to keep his flight together.  He was heard announcing, 'All planes close up tight... we will have to ditch unless landfall... when the first plane drops to 10 gallons we all go down together.'  He was also heard repeatedly asking, 'What course are we on now?', which was the last thing Fort Lauderdale heard from him at 6:37pm.  These faint transmissions faded out completely at 7:04pm, when Ensign Rossi was heard repeating his call sign, 'Fox Tare Three... For Tare Three... Fox Tare Three...'  This came over the radio clearly before ending abruptly.  It is assumed that sometime over the next hour the five bombers descended into the tubulent seas below, with experts commenting that a TBM would sink in under a minute.

Flight 19's fuel endurance was questionable when it was estimated to be exhausted by 6:30pm, the 7pm, and finally 8pm that night.  These estimates did not take into account the possibility of the pilots adjusting their control settings and throttling back, which would allow them to stagger their fuel, prolonging their already extensive fuel range.  This action would, however, slow their cruising speed potentially accounting for the statement that they didn't seem to be making much progress.  It wouldn't, however, explain how they came to be so far north to begin with.  Some TBM Avenger pilots have commented that they could have extended their flight time to seven or eight hours in total, giving them roughly two hours of extra flight time after the last brief message was heard at 7:04pm.

Over the years many questions have been asked as to how this disaster could have happened, with some arguing that the Navy had tried to conceal certain facts that would indicate that Flight 19 had been captured or destroyed by aliens.  This was due to the report having remained classified for more than three decades.  In actual fact, the reasons for this extended classification can be discerned when we look at how the inefficiency of the rescue units as well as how the situation was dealt with in the beginning.  How did they become so completely lost, and why, when  it became apparent that they were lost, did the involved stations not react as quickly as they could have?

For those that hadn't see the official report, the facts given would make it seem that the flight should have never become lost in the first place.  The weather was fine to average; the airmen had experience - especially Taylor.  The flight plan was routine.  But in truth, while the weather was fine at the start of the flight, it rapidly deteriorated during the flight, with search crafts later reporting unsafe flying conditions and tremendous seas.  During his testimony, Cox, when asked if he had observed the state of the sea, commented: 'The sea was very rough.  It was covered with white caps and long white streamers.  The visibility was very good  in all directions, except directly west.'  WhileTaylor was experienced, he was the exceotion, with other crew members only having around 60 hours flight experience in TBM-type aircraft.  They were students in training.  However, Taylor's experience didn't change the fact that he had only recently moved to Fort Lauderdale from Miami and was unfamiliar with the area, never having flown the route taken by Flight 19.  The 'routine' flight was only routine in the sense that it was a well established training exercise at Fort Lauderdale.  It was actually meant to be a complicated navigation exercise.

One of the Official Accident Reports

 Adding to the problems caused by his disorientation was Taylor's refusal to change his radio frequency to the emergency channel, resulting in his inability to maintain radio contact with the ground stations.  While he feared losing contact with the other planes in his flight, transferring to 3000 kilocycles would have provided an undisturbed channel, free of the interference of Cuban radio stations and enabling stations closer to the flight to remain in contact with them.  It would have also allowed the direction-finding stations to find the flight's position much earlier.  Again, it seems that Taylor had forgotten his training , with an important part of okane procedure being the switch over to the emergency frequency.  This is something Taylor should have done when he first suspected that his squadron were lost.

It is also interesting to note that before the flight took place, Taylor requested that another instructor take his place, giving no reason other that not wanting to take the navigational hop.  While Lieutenant Arthur A. Curtis, who took the request, noticed no strange behaviour, Taylor's judgement throughout the entire flight seemed adversely affected and all available evidence suggests that his actions were the opposite to everything he knew he should have done.  It seems unlikely that the investigators would not have persued this matter if there was any possibility that Taylor was impaired, emotionally or physically.  But could they have been wrong?  According to his room mate, Taylor was very upset about a letter he had received just before the scheduled take off.  He told no one about the contents of the letter and took it with him on the flight.  Is is possible that whatever the letter contained may have contributed to Taylor's anxiety and concentration throughout the exercise.

Hours after the flight was estimated to have exhausted their fuel supply, search pilots are said to have heard the delayed call letters, 'FT... FT...'  This has been dismissed as wishful thinking, although if the flight had throttled back, the letters were potentially from Flight 19, adding yet another layer of mystery.  Where had they been during the hours of radio silence?  One interesting revelation that was not revealed until later was that, at the point Taylor requested the planes close formation, one pilot evidently realized that their heading was taking them further out to sea.  That man, although it is unclear which, defied regulations and broke away from the formation.  He started to fly west towards land.  It remains unknown where this pilot and his plane ended up.

Flight 19 by Spiros Karkavelas

Another interesting fact came to light during the subsequent search for Flight 19.  Captain J. D. Morrison, an Eastern pilot, spotted red flares rising from the sky while flying 10 miles south of Melbourne, Fla.  He knew they were coming from a small island and agreed to lead the search team to the site.  However, the search effoty left a lot to be desired.  Morrison witnessed the Navy's 'careful search of the island' which consisted of a single helicopter that flew three passes over one island which was surrounded by marshy terrain.  There were no ground units involved and the marshes could quite easily conceal any airmen or planes that had crashed, especially if the men were unconscioua or injured to the extent they were unable to signal for help.  The Board of Inquiry criticized the individuals in charge of the search operations, with several high-ranking officers being demoted, including one admiral.  It seems that throughout the entire episode incompetence reigned.

In a formal statement the Fort Lauderdale NAS commanding officer said, 'What happened is unbelievable.  Only fifteen minutes before the squadron of Avengers left our base at 2:10pm that Wednesday, another flight of five similar planes took off, flew exactly the same course and returned safely without incident.'  It encountered no unusual weather conditions,except the wind picked up ten or fifteen knots.  Some of the search pilots believe they hadn't searched far enough north, with orders to search as far as Jacksonville, Florida.  However, if the flight had been any further north, the Gulf Stream's northern current would drag any debris beyond the search area.  Admiral F. D. Wagner added one final note to the report, stating, 'The leaders of the flight became so hopelessly confused as to have suffered something akin to a mental aberration.

Bruce Gernon, another pilot, believes Flight 19 flew into an electromagnetic storm.  Interestingly, electromagnetism can cause several of the problems which some believe were suffered by the squadron.  This includes instrument malfunctions, confusion and disorientation.  Gernon commented, 'I'm convinced that Flight 19 entered this storm at about 3:30, and exited it less that ten minutes later jist before Charles Taylor made his first distress call.  I suspect that Flight 19 penetrated too deeply into the storm and into a field of electromagnetic energy, which had a dramatic effect on the outcome of the flight.'  While there is no definitive proof that the squadron entered an electromagnetic storm, or even that such a storm could affect the minds of the pilots, we do know that storm conditions were present during the flight, that Taylor believed his compasses malfunctioned and that his thinking seemed illogical, confused and disorientated.  This theory is one that has gained popularity over the years and is now a view shared by many.  In a June 1974 issue of 'Sealife', Howard L. Rosenberg writes, 'If the planes were flying through a magnetic storm, all compasses could possibly malfunction.  Actually, men's knowledge of magnetism is limited.  We know how to live with it and escape it by going into space, but we really don't know what exactly it is.'

Many different factors prevented the squadron from returning to land: the failure of the radio channel which Cox needed to communicate with the flight, bad radio reception, the delay in sending the rescue plane out, bad weather, an inability to locate the flight quickly, and the delay in relaying the estimated location once it was known, amongst many other factors.  The most tragic part of the entire incident is that, when Taylor first reported that he was having difficulties, he was probably over the reefs and kays just north of the Bahamas, with the flight being almost exactly on course when the pilots decided they were lost.  Many continue to search for the planes that made up Flight 19 and perhaps they will one day be found to give us the last pieces of the puzzle that remains.

Useful Resources
Into the Bermuda Triangle: Pursuing the Truth Behind the World's Greatest Mystery by Gian Quasar
The Bermuda Triangle Mystery Solved by Lawrence David Kusche
Out of this world: Mysteries of mind, space and time
The Fog: A Never Before Published Theory of the Bermuda Triangle Phenomenon by Bruce Gernon and Rob MacGregor
Naval History & Heritage
Historynet.com